Global Times editorial（02-07-2021）

Commenting on a report in the Washington Post about China’s nuclear capability building, US State Department spokesman Ned Price said on Thursday that the build-up of nuclear forces had become more difficult for China to hide and it appeared to be deviating from decades of nuclear strategy based on minimal deterrence. Price said China’s nuclear arsenal “will grow more quickly, and to a higher level than perhaps previously anticipated.” “This build-up is concerning,” he noted.  

The Washington Post reported on Wednesday that China has begun the construction of 119 nearly identical sites in a desert near the northwestern city of Yumen, Gansu Province. The report quoted Jeffrey Lewis, a researcher at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in California, asserting that judging from commercial satellite images, these construction sites contain features that mirror those seen at existing launch facilities for China’s arsenal of nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles. It claimed that China is building more than 100 new missile silos, which, if completed, would represent a “historic shift” for China’s nuclear arsenal.

Lewis said that the silos are probably intended for DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missiles which can carry multiple warheads and reach targets as far as the US mainland. 

Since the beginning of this year, some US and Western organizations have continuously revealed various assessments claiming China is increasing nuclear warheads, building nuclear triad capacity and constructing new silos. The US has also repeatedly raised these issues based on speculative information. Their purpose is obvious: to exert public opinion pressure on China’s nuclear deterrence building and force China to respond to their speculation. They aim to hamper China’s nuclear capacity building by making an issue of it and putting China in a passive position to defend itself. 

For instance, by accusing China of building new silos or increasing nuclear warheads, those US and Western organizations may create in the public an impression that China shouldn’t do that, even though China could deny the accusations.

Some forces in the US and West aim at such a scenario, in which China is forced to give up nuclear deterrence development to avoid being caught by them. In that case, their accusations on China will become “international morality,” while China has to exercise stricter self-discipline.    

It’s unknown whether the Washington Post report corresponds to the real situation. But generally speaking, silos are normally used for liquid-fuel intercontinental missiles. Such missiles are high-thrust and long-range, and could carry higher-yield nuclear warheads. Silos provide good conditions for the storage and maintenance of missiles and are able to shorten launch time under emergency situations. However, Lewis assumed that the “silos” in Gansu are intended for DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missiles. In reality, DF-41 is solid-fueled and is loaded on high-mobility launcher vehicles. The necessity of putting it inside a silo is questionable. Therefore, the latest accusations by Washington Post and the US State Department over China cannot hold water.  

We suggest China ignore the information and accusations by the US and the West. China must not be led by the nose. Let them say whatever they want to say and make speculations. This can also be seen as a way for China to realize nuclear deterrence at the current stage. 

Land-based ballistic missiles are an important part of nuclear deterrence. The US has at least 450 silos. The modernization of silos is irreplaceable for countries to build a nuclear triad capacity. There are often both real silos and decoy silos. The distribution of China’s silos for land-based ballistic missiles is the country’s top secret. 

The US wants China to stick to the line based around minimal deterrence. It’s true that China has said it keeps its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security. But the minimum level would change as China’s security situation changes. China has been defined as the top strategic competitor by the US and the US military pressure on China has continued to increase. Therefore, China must quicken the increase of its nuclear deterrence to curb the US strategic impulse. We must build credible nuclear second-strike capability, which needs to be guaranteed by enough nuclear warheads. 

China’s security situation is changing rapidly. The US has the strategic ambition to subdue China. Once a military confrontation between China and the US over the Taiwan question breaks out, if China has enough nuclear capacity to deter the US, that will serve as the foundation of China’s national will. We are facing different environments and risks from the past. The calculation methods for the minimum level must also be different. Regardless of what the US says, China must be sober and firm about what it should do. 

中國核威懾力建設決不能被美方牽制

環球時報社論2021-07-02

美國國務院發言人普賴斯星期四對《華盛頓郵報》的一則報道作出評論時說，中國的核建設越來越難以掩蓋，似乎偏離了幾十年來以最低威懾為基礎的核戰略。他說，這表明中國的核武庫將增長得更快，並達到可能高於此前預期的水平，並稱「這種增長令人擔憂」。

《華盛頓郵報》週三報道說，中國已開始在甘肅玉門附近數百平方英里的沙漠地區建造119個幾乎一模一樣的工地。報道援引美國加州一核不擴散研究中心專家傑弗里·劉易斯的話說，他們根據商業衛星圖像判斷，這些工地的特徵與人們看到的中國現有彈道導彈發射設施相似，因此指這些工地在建設100多個洲際彈道導彈發射井。報道稱，這代表著中國核武庫「歷史性的轉變」。

劉易斯認為，這些「發射井」可能是為東風-41洲際彈道導彈設計的，他強調這種導彈可以攜帶多枚彈頭，使美國大陸處於射程之內。

今年以來，美國及西方的一些機構不斷放出中國正在增加核彈頭、建設「三位一體」核打擊力量、增加新的發射井等各種評估，美國官方也一再提出這個問題，其中很多信息屬於猜測性的。他們的目的很明顯，就是要向中國的核威懾建設施加輿論壓力，逼中方就各種似是而非的信息表態，形成美西方高調炒作、中國招架應付的態勢，從而起到束縛中方手腳的效果。

比如，他們說中國在某個地方建設新的導彈發射井，或者增加了多少枚核彈頭，中國如果否認了這方面的某個具體指控，這當中會潛含一個中方不應該那樣做的輿論效應和邏輯。

美西方一些力量就是想讓中方從否認發展核威懾力的西方指控變成我們真的不去那樣做，以免被他們抓到確鑿的把柄。那樣的話，對中國的這類指責和監督就會變成某種「國際道義」，而中方被迫越來越嚴格地自我約束。

華郵最新指控是否對應了實際情況，我們不得而知。不過通常來說，發射井一般都會用於液體助推燃料的洲際彈道導彈，這樣的導彈往往推力大、射程遠，可攜帶當量更大的核彈頭。發射井提供了儲存、保養導彈的良好條件，而且能夠在緊急情況下縮短髮射時間。但是，劉易斯推測甘肅這批「發射井」是為東風-41建造的，而該導彈使用固體燃料，裝載在高機動的發射車上，把它們再放到發射井里的必要性值得懷疑。因此，華郵和美國國務院的最新指控至少是粗糙的。

我們主張，中方無須理會美西方對中國加強核威懾戰略發出的各種信息和指責，決不被他們牽制，隨之起舞。他們願意說什麼就說什麼，讓他們去猜好了，這也可以看成現階段中國實現核威懾的一種方式。

陸基彈道導彈是核大國威懾力量的重要組成部分，美國的發射井至少有450個。在發展「三位一體」核力量的時候，先進發射井的作用不可取代。另外，發射井通常有真的，也有「誘餌」發射井，中國陸基洲際彈道導彈發射井的實際分布位置無疑屬於中國的最高機密。

美國現在就想讓中國保持「最低核威懾」的路線。不錯，中國表示，我們國家的核力量始終維持在國家安全需要的最低水平。但是，這個最低水平必須是高度可靠的，它會隨著中國國家安全形勢的變化而變化。現在中國被美國定義成「頭號戰略競爭對手」，美國對華軍事壓力持續增加，中國制止美國戰略衝動的核威懾力必須隨之加快提升。我們的第二次核打擊能力需要充分可信，這必須由足夠數量的核彈頭和它們的高生存力提供保障。

誰都看到中國的安全形勢在急劇變化，美國存在「壓服中國」的戰略野心，中美一旦因某種情況出現軍事對抗，能夠充足震懾美國的核力量將是中國屆時國家意志的基礎。所以說，今天的最低水平和之前的最低水平面對著截然不同的環境和風險，它們的計算方式同樣必然是不一樣的。因此，讓美國去說，該怎麼做，中國必將清醒、堅定。