By Dr. Dan Steinbock
Recently, the Trump and Biden administrations have been pressuring China about Xinjiang. What drives these efforts is the Cold Warriors’ Afghanistan 2.0 scenario.
SINCE Sept. 11, 2001, America’s foray into the Middle East and Central Asia has resulted in repeated violations of international law, massive bloodshed and unwarranted wars, according to critics.
In China, Uighur extremists committed more than 200 acts of terrorism with over 160 deaths between 1990 and 2001. In the past two decades, Uighur groups have escalated terrorism with the support of foreign jihadists, far-right groups and external backing.
In July 2020, the United Nations noted the presence of thousands of Uighur fighters in Afghanistan and Syria. Oddly, the Trump administration supported these “moderate jihadists.” In terms of timing, the reversal in Washington’s policies followed the trade-war stalemate with China.
For years, the United States had classified the Uighur East Turkestan Islamic Movement as a terrorist group, battled Uighur fighters in Afghanistan and held many as prisoners. Yet, in November 2020, former secretary of state Mike Pompeo delisted the movement as a terrorist organization.
The strategic objective of the reversal, observers believe, is to support destabilization in Xinjiang. The Biden administration seems to have opted for a similar approach. The lessons of the recent decades should necessitate caution with such policy changes.
Afghanistan’s dire realities
Since the 1980s and particularly after Sept. 11, 2001, Afghanistan has been the prime recipient of billions of dollars of US economic and military aid. Between 1950 and 2020, the United States sold almost $16-billion worth of weapons to Afghanistan, two-thirds of which were exchanged since 2016, according to congressional research.
Despite massive aid, Afghan gross domestic product (GDP) per capita remains barely $1,900 – at par with Yemen and Sierra Leone. Inequality compounds the challenges. The wealthy 10 percent of the population own 45 percent of national income.
Since 2001, some 241,000 people have been killed in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Over 71,000 of those killed have been civilians. Meanwhile, the United States has suffered over 22,000 military casualties including 2,400 fatalities in Afghanistan.
As a recent congressional report concluded, “future prospects of gains remain mixed.”
In the past two decades, the US Congress has appropriated a whopping $143 billion for “reconstruction” and “security forces” in Afghanistan. However, this lucrative bonanza seems to have benefited defense contractors and privatized security forces rather than the Afghan people as their low per capita incomes suggest.
Xinjiang’s development realities
In northeastern China, Xinjiang is one of the 12 provincial-level administrative entities that has been included in China’s Western territories’ development strategy since 2000. Between 2014 and 2019, Xinjiang’s economy increased annually by 7.2 percent as nearly 3 million residents were lifted out of poverty.
Urbanization rate climbed from 37 percent to 50 percent, which is at par with that of Thailand. Purchasing-power adjusted GDP per capita rose to the Indonesian level.
Xinjiang has 26 million people, almost half of whom are Uighur Muslims who were not subject to China’s one-child policy that prevailed nationwide until 2015. China has favored economic policies that have more in common with “affirmative action”-style efforts in the United States.
Xinjiang has been the target of a huge influx of investments connected to the “19 Provinces and Cities support Xinjiang” central plan. Obviously, China has promoted economic development in Xinjiang to foster growth and prosperity, in part to preempt radicalization through cross-border infiltration via Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Externally, the key role belongs to the massive Belt and Road Initiative, in which Xinjiang serves as the Chinese gate to the West.
Thanks to development, Xinjiang’s per capita incomes on average are today 50 and 75 percent higher than in Pakistan and Afghanistan, respectively.
Nonetheless, the architects of regional friction are disinterested in such outcomes. They see China as Soviet Union 2.0 and Xinjiang as Afghanistan 2.0.
Afghanistan 2.0 scenario
In 1979 to 1989, the Central Intelligence Agency, supported by the British MI6, armed and funded Afghan mujahideen to drive the Soviet troops from and achieve regime change in Afghanistan. Today, the same dream is cherished for Xinjiang.
The CIA played the key role in the 1980s multibillion-dollar Operation Cyclone, which armed the Islamic mujahideen against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Ironically, it also came to fund and train the future founders of Al-Qaeda, including Osama bin Laden, and other jihadist groups.
After two decades of hollow pledges of peace and stability, US credibility has collapsed in Afghanistan. Former president Hamid Karzai has criticized the United States and called its legacy a disaster as it leaves the country embroiled by more extremism than when it came in.
As the Taliban is about to return to power, US intelligence experts expect the Afghan government to survive only six to 12 months. That’s the legacy of two decades of fatal military interventions. The ensuing instability could spill over across the borders.
That’s why in the recent trilateral dialogue meeting, China, Afghanistan and Pakistan pledged to strengthen economic, political and security ties. If peace is given a chance, stability could make economic development viable.
What is certain is that an Afghanistan 2.0 scenario in Xinjiang would amount to a nightmare with global repercussions.
Republished from Manila Times