Ernesto M. Hilario
“The dispute between Canberra and Washington is worrisome.”
This year, the Philippines and Australia commemorate the 75 anniversary of diplomatic relations. We have maintained cordial and friendly ties since the end of the Second World War based on mutual interests in trade, development, defense and security. We have also forged strong people-to-people bonds; in fact, today there are more than 300,000 people in Australia of Filipino heritage.
While our relations with Australia are going strong, those between Australia and China have been marked by dispute of late.
There’s been growing differences in defense, trade and foreign policy. Australian politicians have noted with concern China’s assertive foreign policy and the rapid modernization of its military.
In 2017, Australia banned foreign political donations, with officials warning of “disturbing reports” of Chinese attempts to influence the political process in Canberra.
In 2018, Australia became the first country to ban Chinese tech giant Huawei from its 5G network. It also blocked 10 Chinese investment deals across infrastructure, agriculture and animal husbandry.
Relations worsened further in 2020 when Australia called for an inquiry into the origins of the new coronavirus, which was first detected in the Chinese city of Wuhan.
On the other hand, China has also expressed dismay, even anger, over Australian criticism of its actions in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Taiwan and the South China Sea, saying that Australian leaders have repeatedly made wrong statements and actions on issues concerning China’s core interests” and urging Australia to undertake “deep reflection”.
Another source of tensions has been Australia’s participation in the Quad, an informal grouping that includes the United States, India and Japan. Beijing has called the alliance a US-led attempt to create an “Asian version of NATO.”
In May last year, China curbed Australian beef imports and levied tariffs totaling 80.5 percent on Australian barley. In November, it imposed tariffs worth 200 percent on Australian wine and was expected to block further imports, including sugar, lobster, coal and copper ore.
As China accounts for about 35 percent of Australia’s total trade, some experts fear an all-out trade war could cost the latter 6 percent of its GDP. In contrast, Australia accounts for less than 4 percent of China’s commerce.
Journalists have also been affected by the strained bilateral relations. In June, Australian intelligence and police raided the homes of four Chinese journalists over alleged influence campaigns, while authorities in China questioned two Australian journalists in a national security probe in September, prompting them to leave the country.
An Australian analyst had suggested that if Australia wants to resolve the dispute, it may need to apologize for calling for the COVID-19 inquiry, distance itself from the Quad and promise to respect China’s core interests.
But that appears highly unlikely, as Prime Minister Scott has indicated that Australia will not reverse its China policy after the Chinese embassy listed its grievances with the Australian media.
“I can assure you, we will always be Australia, act in our interests and in accordance with our values.”
Given all this, you could be forgiven for thinking that Australia considers China as its main foreign affairs challenge.
But Daniel Flitton, editor of the Lowy Institute digital magazine and a former intelligence analyst, does not see the dispute between Canberra and Beijing as worrisome as that between Canberra and Washington.
Flitton even describes the United States, not China, as Australia’s “most difficult relationship.”
In a commentary in the Australian Financial Review in November, shortly after the disputed US election, Flitton argued: “Be it under Trump or Biden, the next US administration would make even more demands of Australia as upheaval roils the world”. He predicted that if Joe Biden finally sits in the White House, Washington would find it “critically important to recognize the special test involved in managing the US alliance.”
Another Australian analyst, Ben Smith, writing in the same publication, said in December last year that “Australia needs America to follow global rules too.”
“Australia’s worsening China relationship is—at its core—a product of our close alliance with the US. Beijing sees itself as being in a zero-sum contest with Washington, and Australia as being on the wrong side of the ledger.”
He cited Biden’s National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan who has stated that “America will stand shoulder to shoulder with our ally, Australia, and rally fellow democracies to advance our shared security, prosperity, and values.”
Further on, Smith said: “The real question is: what should Canberra seek from Washington? As Washington’s vast interagency policy machine grinds back into operation, our embassy should have many opportunities to be heard. On China issues, Australia is in good standing on both sides of US politics. But we should be blunt where necessary in pointing out how the world has changed, and how US policy must too…”
Smith believes that “Canberra should argue that the US should aim for more than mere coexistence with China. We want that coexistence to be ordered by more acceptance—on both sides—of widely accepted norms and rules. Those norms should apply equally to all states, not just the great powers. But that would require the US to be more compliant with international law than it has been in the past.”
Source：Manila Standard 12-03-2021