Last of 2 parts
By RICARDO SALUDO
THE wrong way of defending our maritime territories, discussed in last Thursday’s (May 13, 2021) column (https://www.manilatimes.net/2021/05/13/opinion/columnists/the-right-and-wrong-ways-to-defend-our-territory/872764/), breaks a paramount rule of national defense: don’t endanger the mainland in defending faraway frontiers.
Bringing in massive American forces in our effort to assert sovereign rights gravely risks dragging the Philippines into possible conflicts between the United States and nuclear-armed adversaries like China and North Korea.
Especially if, as reportedly planned by the Indo-Pacific Command, US Army and Marines units aim to use the Philippines for missile attacks on Chinese forces during war under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA).
Plainly, implementing the 2014 accord between the Aquino 3rd and Obama administrations could bring destructive and possibly nuclear attack on us, particularly the five bases for US military use under EDCA, situated in Nueva Ecija and Pampanga, and near Puerto Princesa, Cebu City and Cagayan de Oro.
The advice Washington ignored
So, if not sailing and saber rattling with America, how can the Philippines defend its territorial claims and sovereign rights in the South China Sea?
Three letters and a number: A2-AD. That’s short for anti-access, area denial systems, which aim to deter intrusions through constant surveillance and powerful weaponry.
That was the recommendation of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), a leading Washington security think-tank, in April 2012, around the time when we lost control of Scarborough Shoal in a botched confrontation with Chinese maritime security forces.
In “The Geostrategic Return of the Philippines,” CSBA vice president of studies Jim Thomas and US Air Force strategist Harry Foster urged Washington to help our military build up A2-AD capabilities (https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/2012.04.18-Geostrategic-Return-Philippines.pdf):
“Emphasis should be on providing defensive systems like maritime surveillance aircraft, coastal anti-ship defenses, and air defense systems. The United States should consider providing its ally with excess military capabilities like Predator unmanned aircraft and naval patrol craft.”
Patrol planes would watch the sea, covering far greater expanses in much less time than frigates and boats. Missiles would deter interlopers, even large warships, and air defense systems would protect rockets and bases, especially from jets firing missiles that home in on missile radar.
The late Arroyo-era national security adviser, Parañaque congressman and Philippine Navy chief Roilo Golez, a graduate of the US Naval Academy, had long advocated the purchase and deployment of BrahMos supersonic anti-ship missiles, developed and made in India, based on Russian projectiles.
The BrahMos’ range exceeding 300 kilometers would cover our entire exclusive economic zone (EEZ), in whose waters we have sole rights for economic activities, as well as most of our extended continental shelf (ECS), where resources on or in the seabed are reserved for us.
Mounted three on a truck, the BrahMos can be rapidly deployed where needed and would be hard to find and take out. Its supersonic speed makes it near impossible to dodge. India is also developing an 800-kilometer version, which can reach all the way to the Chinese coast from Northern Luzon. Vietnam is buying the projectile, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is finally looking seriously at it.
Why only now? And why didn’t the US heed the CSBA’s A2-AD advice?
A retired Filipino general and former ambassador confided that US military advisers were not keen on the BrahMos. One possible reason: they did not relish the idea that the most potent armament in the AFP arsenal had Russian technology. Another thought: anti-ship missiles are such a powerful deterrent they can substantially reduce our reliance on the US in asserting maritime claims.
The recent good news, however, is that America now favors the BrahMos for the AFP because it wants to boost defense ties with India, one of the four nations in the US-led Quadrilateral Alliance, along with Japan and Australia. Indeed, India would be crucial in interdicting Chinese naval and commercial vessels in the Indian Ocean, including tankers laden with Middle East oil.
Golez wanted 200 BrahMos; the military could acquire 100 initially, plus Japan’s Mitsubishi Type 88 or Type 12 projectiles (range: 200 km) at a discount. For P40 billion, the AFP could have 100 BrahMos and maybe 200 Mitsubishis, deployed together, so adversaries don’t know which ones are pointed at them.
What about planes? In 2019, the Philippine Air Force (PAF) already had eight Beechcrafts given by Japan, plus C-295 planes ordered from Indonesia. For about P15 billion, the PAF can add half a dozen high-performance maritime patrol aircraft for a future fleet of 16 surveillance planes.
The AFP could spend another P20 billion for air defense, for a total A2-AD bill of P75 billion. Do we have that kind of money?
Budget officials had told Golez that Malampaya gas royalties — now well over P150 billion — could be used for weaponry securing offshore oil and gas deposits. And when President Rodrigo Duterte visited India in 2019, he got a billion-dollar credit line to buy Indian products.
With patrol aircraft and supersonic missiles guarding the West Philippine Sea, protected by air defenses, the Philippines would become a porcupine nation, which no country, not even China, could take lightly. If anyone encroaches on our islands and waters, we can make them bleed.
A2-AD systems would also deter invasion, putting enemy troops on ships and planes at huge risk. Combined with the naval and air forces of our Western and Asia-Pacific allies, anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles would make the conquest of the Philippines prohibitively costly, if not sure to fail.
But will our allies protect us from a full-scale invasion? Will America come to our defense without the massive force deployment and access to air bases under EDCA?
As the CSBA paper argues, the Philippines affords immense strategic value in regional defense. Losing our archipelago to a hostile power would conjure a mammoth security nightmare for our allies. EDCA or no EDCA, they would fight to keep us from falling into enemy hands.
Ric Saludo, chief strategy officer of the Center for Strategy, Enterprise & Intelligence (CenSEI), was an editor with Asiaweek magazine and strategic adviser for Malacañang.
Republished from Manila Times 20 May 2021